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Abstract: Both causation and moral responsibility seem to come in degrees, but 
explaining the metaphysical relationship between them is more complex than theorists 
have realized. This paper poses an original puzzle about this relationship and uses it to 
reach three important conclusions. First, certain natural resolutions of the puzzle reveal 
the existence of a new sort of moral luck called proportionality luck. Second, there is 
indeterminacy in the type of causal relation deployed in assessments of moral 
responsibility. Finally—and most importantly--leading theories of causation do not have 
the ability to capture the sorts of causal differences that matter for moral evaluation of 
agents’ causal contributions to outcomes. 
 
Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility 




 On the face of it, you are only morally responsible for what you cause. One thing 
that matters for the degree to which you are morally responsible for an outcome is your 
precise causal contribution to the outcome—intuitively, “how much” you contribute to 
the outcome’s occurrence. Having an adequate theory of such degrees of causal 
contribution is essential for unpacking the role of causation in attributions of moral 
responsibility, and in understanding the metaphysical relationship between causation and 
moral responsibility more generally. This paper poses a puzzle about the relationship 
between degrees of causation and degrees of moral responsibility, and uses it to argue 
that the metaphysical relationship between them is much more complex than theorists 
have realized.  
 The puzzle is brought out in the following pair of cases: 
 (Victim) Two independently employed assassins, unaware of each other, are 
 dispatched to eliminate Victim. Being struck by one bullet is sufficient to kill 
 Victim. Each assassin shoots, and Victim dies. 
  
 (Hardy Victim) Two independently employed assassins, each unaware of the 
 other, are dispatched to eliminate Victim. Unbeknownst to both assassins, Victim 
 is particularly hardy, and requires two bullets for his demise. Each assassin 
 shoots, and Victim dies.  
 
The cases differ causally insofar as Victim is a case of causal overdetermination, in 
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which there are multiple sufficient causes of an outcome, whereas Hardy Victim is a case 
of joint causation, in which there are multiple necessary causes of an outcome. But do the 
cases differ morally? That is: does each assassin’s proportion of moral responsibility for 
Victim’s death quantitatively differ between Victim and Hardy Victim? Call this The 
Moral Difference Puzzle.1  
 In section 1, I use the Moral Difference Puzzle to unearth and develop a new kind 
of moral luck I call proportionality luck. Proportionality luck involves an agent’s 
proportion of moral responsibility for an outcome being out of that agent’s control. In 
section 2, I argue that the central pair of cases in the Moral Difference Puzzle reveals 
indeterminacy in the causal relations deployed in assessments of moral responsibility. In 
section 3, I argue that no leading theory of causation can capture the principle that 
underlies the sorts of differences in causal contribution that matter for moral 
responsibility.  
 First, a few preliminaries. There are many aspects of agents’ actions that are 
relevant for moral responsibility. Here I will be specifically interested in the relationship 
between causation and moral responsibility, so I will not be primarily concerned with 
features of the examples that would normally be considered highly morally relevant to 
such cases: for example, intentions of the agents, duties, and expectations. I will assume 
that we can make philosophical progress on the relationship between causation and moral 
responsibility even when setting these things aside. Thus, I will treat the agents in the 
central pair of cases as on par with respect to intentions, duties, expectations, and so on. 
 Second, I will not offer a general theory of what moral responsibility is. Though I 
take my results to be applicable to many theories of moral responsibility, I will assume 
here that moral responsibility at least partially tracks praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness, that these can come in degrees, and that adequate sense can be made of 
degrees of praise and blame.  
 
1.1 The Logical Space of Answers 
 
 Return to the Moral Difference Puzzle. Its possible resolutions are:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Carolina Sartorio (forthcoming) discusses a similar puzzle that she had been working on independently.  
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 (1) No moral difference. There is no moral difference between (Victim) and 
 (Hardy Victim). Each assassin in (Victim) bears equal moral responsibility to the 
 individual assassins in (Hardy Victim).  
 
 (2) Moral difference: greater. There is a moral difference between (Victim) and 
 (Hardy Victim). Each assassin in (Victim) bears greater moral responsibility than 
 each assassin in (Hardy Victim).  
  
 (3) Moral difference: lesser. There is a moral difference between (Victim) and 
 (Hardy Victim). Each assassin in (Victim) bears less moral responsibility than 
 each assassin in (Hardy Victim).  
  
   
According to answer (1), there is no moral difference between the assassins in (Victim) 
and (Hardy Victim). One motivation for this view is that the intentions and actions of the 
assassins in both (Victim) and (Hardy Victim) are identical. If we hold that the way 
things turn out is irrelevant to the blameworthiness of agents2, then the cases of joint 
causation and overdetermination are identical with respect to amounts of moral 
blameworthiness.  
 But this approach is problematic insofar as it divorces moral evaluation of agents’ 
causal contribution to outcomes from the way that things actually turn out. Retaining a 
relationship between actual causation and moral responsibility requires that quantitative 
differences in actual causal contribution lead to quantitative differences in moral 
responsibility between agents.  
 It is most plausible to hold that the greater or lesser an agent’s actual causal 
contribution to an outcome, the greater or lesser her moral responsibility for that outcome 
(ceteris paribus). More formally, moral evaluation of an agent’s contribution generally 
adheres to the following principle:  
  
 Proportionality. An agent’s moral responsibility for an outcome is proportionate 
 to her actual causal contribution to the outcome. 
 
This principle is a precisification of the intuitive doctrine with which we started: if one is 
morally responsible only for the outcome that one causes, one should also only be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This position is termed rationalism by Wolf (2001). 
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morally responsible for the part or proportion of an outcome that one causes. 
Proportionality extends an everyday intuition about moral responsibility for whole 
outcomes to moral responsibility for parts of outcomes. Accepting this plausible principle 
requires that we reject answer (1).  
 
1.2 Proportionality Luck 
 
 On to the latter two answers to the puzzle. According to both answers, there is a 
moral difference between the agents in (Victim) and (Hardy Victim). Committing to a 
moral difference between these cases in either direction is a commitment to the existence 
of moral luck. Specifically, it is a commitment to the existence of resultant moral luck. 
Resultant luck is the sort of moral luck that arises when the ways that our acts turn out, or 
the consequences of our acts, are beyond our control. Resultant luck is often 
demonstrated by appeal to example. The paradigmatic pair of contrast cases that illustrate 
resultant moral luck involve a lucky driver and an unlucky driver. Both are negligent 
drivers, but a pedestrian appears in the unlucky driver’s path whereas one does not appear 
in the lucky driver’s path. The unlucky driver kills the pedestrian; the lucky driver returns 
home without incident. Only the unlucky driver is morally responsible for a pedestrian’s 
death.  
 Proportionality is an extension of the reasoning that undergirds these more 
general cases of moral luck. Just as the unlucky driver is morally responsible for what she 
actually causes—a pedestrian’s death--and the lucky driver is not morally responsible in 
virtue of the death’s not having occurred, an agent is morally responsible only for the 
proportion of an outcome that she actually causes.3 The unlucky driver is unlucky 
precisely because the consequences of her negligent driving are not under her control. 
Similarly, Victim’s hardiness is a matter out of the assassins’ control. Each assassin in 
(Victim) and (Hardy Victim) sets out to eliminate the victim himself: the assassins’ 
intentions are the same in both cases. Since Victim’s hardiness lies out of the assassins’ 
control, it is a matter of luck that each assassin’s portion of causal responsibility in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The “actual” in “actual causal contribution” is meant to stand in contrast to an agent’s merely 
counterfactual causal contribution. 
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(Victim) differs from each assassin’s portion of causal responsibility in (Hardy Victim). 
Assuming that Proportionality is true, this quantitative difference in causal 
responsibility generates a quantitative difference in moral responsibility owing to 
resultant luck. 
 Call this sort of moral luck proportionality luck. Proportionality luck involves 
circumstances out of an agent’s control either increasing or decreasing that agent’s 
proportion of moral responsibility for an outcome. Proportionality luck can be thought of 
as a type of resultant luck, since it involves the way that an outcome turns out. It is a 
natural outgrowth of the idea that an agent’s moral responsibility is proportionate to her 
actual causal contribution to an outcome. 
 Proportionality luck is everywhere. Almost every one of us in the first world 
produces a portion of carbon emissions sufficient to do some portion of environmental 
damage; it is a matter of luck which of us do more damage than others. Many people use 
antibiotics even when they are not necessary; it is a matter of luck which users contribute 
to antibiotic resistance more than others. 
 In addition to moral blameworthiness, moral praiseworthiness is also subject to 
proportionality luck. Charities claim that “every little bit helps”. Consider a case in which 
ten individuals donate to charity, and it only takes five of their contributions to alleviate 
hunger in the stricken area. (The excess funds go to smaller, but still important, tasks, 
such as providing clean places to bathe.) Here, which agents are responsible for the actual 
alleviation of hunger is a matter of causal luck—i.e., which donations actually end up 
helping the victims. 
 Note that cases of preemption, as when Assassin 1 shoots and kills victim first, 
thus preempting Assassin 2’s bullet from causing Victim’s death, are cases of traditional 
resultant moral luck. For presumably Assassin 2’s bullet makes no actual causal 
contribution to Victim’s death. In contrast to these traditional cases, what is distinctive 
about proportionality luck is that there are multiple actual causal contributions to the 
outcome. 
  Proportionality luck is unique along several dimensions. First and most obviously, 
there is a different basis for moral differentiation between lucky and unlucky agents. 
Whereas traditional cases of moral luck involve moral differentiation between agents 
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based on the occurrence of an outcome (e.g. the pedestrian’s death) versus the non-
occurrence of that outcome, proportionality luck involves a fixed outcome with 
quantitatively different causal contributions. The question is not whether the relevant 
outcome occurs, but rather, what comparative causal proportions contribute to the 
outcome’s occurrence.4 
 Proportionality luck is more intricate than other types of resultant moral luck. 
This complexity is made apparent when one attempts to apply Sartorio’s (2013) 
distinction between two senses of “how things turn out” in cases of resultant moral luck. 
One sense is outcome-driven, tracking whether and how an outcome occurs after the 
agent acts. Another sense is agent-driven, tracking how the agent ends up being related to 
an outcome.  
 Consider the distinction at work in typical case of resultant luck involving drunk 
drivers. Outcome-driven moral luck captures the occurrence of the bad outcome (the 
pedestrian’s death) apart from how the agent is related to it. Agent-driven moral luck 
captures the fact that the unlucky agent ended up being causally responsible for the 
outcome. What is out of an agent’s control in outcome-driven moral luck is whether a 
particular outcome occurs. What is out of an agent’s control in agent-driven moral luck is 
whether the agent’s behavior ends up resulting in (that is, being causally related to) the 
particular outcome—in this case, the pedestrian’s death. For example, suppose that the 
pedestrian, hit by the truck of a negligent driver, dies of a totally unrelated health 
condition a short while later. Here, though the driver is unlucky that he hit a pedestrian, 
his negligence does not actually result in Victim’s death.  
 As a genus, proportionality luck straddles the distinction between outcome-driven 
and agent-driven resultant moral luck. Some species are outcome-driven and other 
species are agent driven. In (Hardy Victim), whether the outcome occurs is out of an 
agent’s control: had the other assassin not been present, Victim would not have died. The 
very occurrence of the outcome is out of each assassin’s control. But in analyzing the 
moral difference between (Victim) and (Hardy Victim), what is out of each assassin’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Elizabeth Harman astutely pointed out to me that cases of “traditional” moral luck might also be thought 
of as cases of proportionality luck in the following sense: one agent is responsible for the entire outcome 
and another agent is responsible for none of the outcome. Here I will restrict my focus to cases in which 
both agents causally contribute to the outcome in some way, and are thus each responsible for some of the 
outcome. 
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control is her quantitative causal contribution to the outcome. For it is a matter of luck 
whether she is partly or fully causally responsible for the outcome.   
 Proportionality luck is unique because it hinges on the idea of differential causal 
contribution, i.e., multiple agents being differentially causally responsible for the same 
outcome. Proportionality luck is interesting partly because its existence follows naturally 
from a commitment to Proportionality. Aside from being a basis of much of our 
thinking about moral luck, this principle also infuses other parts of moral theory-- for 
example, formulations of consequentialism. It is therefore important to have a careful 
account of what it is for an agent to be more or less causally responsible for an outcome, 
as in the case of Victim and Hardy Victim. But I will now suggest that such an account 
faces several obstacles: first, an intractable conflict between two types of causal 
intuitions; and second, a resistance to being captured by leading theories of causation.  
   
2.0 A Causal Ambiguity in Differences of Contribution 
  
 The Moral Difference Puzzle asks: is there a moral difference between the 
assassins in both cases? Assuming the answer is yes, there is a prior question: are the 
assassins in (Victim) more or less causally responsible than those in (Hardy Victim)? I 
have stayed silent on this topic until now. 
 Prima facie, it is plausible to say that each assassin in (Victim) is more causally 
responsible than each assassin in (Hardy Victim). The idea is that each assassin is “fully” 
responsible for an outcome in a case of overdetermination, but only “partly” responsible 
in a case of joint causation. Joint causation is often thought of as a kind of “causal 
teamwork”, whereas overdetermination is often thought of as “double the causation”. 
These sorts of causal intuitions implicitly employ a “productive” or oomph theory of 
causation.5 According to that sort of theory, causation is a matter of energy transference 
between a cause and an effect. Because it takes two assassins to transfer the necessary 
energy to Victim in the joint causation case, each agent is partially responsible for the 
death. And because either transfer of energy would have been sufficient to kill Victim in 
the overdetermination case, both assassins are, in a sense, “fully” responsible for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Here I rely on Ned Hall’s (2004) distinction between dependent and productive concepts of causation. 
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Victim’s death. This sort of thinking motivates answer 2: Moral Difference: Greater. 
 But there is another causal reading of the case. Rather than invoke “productive” 
causal intuitions, consider “dependent” or counterfactual causal intuitions about our 
cases. In a case of joint causation, each cause is necessary to bring about an effect. If one 
cause fails to occur, then the effect fails to occur. In a way, then, each assassin is more 
essential to the victim’s death in (Hardy Victim) than in (Victim), for the victim’s death 
would have occurred no matter what the second assassin did in (Victim), but not if the 
second assassin had opted out in (Hardy Victim). The difference is powerfully brought 
out in the following omissive variant on the case: 
 
 (Conscientious Objector) Two assassins on the same team have been dispatched 
 to eliminate Victim. Each knows that Victim is particularly hardy and requires 
 both bullets for his demise. Assassin 1 shoots. Assassin 2 is gripped by a crisis 
 of conscience, and does not shoot. Victim survives.  
 
In this case, had Assassin 2 fired his bullet, Hardy Victim would have died. But the 
failure of Assassin 2 to fire causes Victim’s survival. In joint causation cases, 
counterfactual dependencies hold between each conjunct of a conjunction of necessary 
causes, whereas in overdetermination cases, counterfactual dependence does not obtain 
between either conjunct and the effect. In joint causation cases, a single conjunctive 
cause is just as important to the occurrence of an effect as a necessary cause in a case 
with a single sufficient cause. Consider the following additional example:  
 
 (Soldiers) Five soldiers in a military installation are each positioned at a button. 
 All five button-pushes are necessary to bring about the launching of a weapon, 
 and the soldiers are all aware of the launch requirements. A call comes down from 
 on high to launch the weapon at a group of innocent children. Four soldiers push 
 their buttons, and one soldier abstains from pressing his button. The weapon does 
 not launch.  
 
Here, the conscientious soldier’s failure to press the button has the same outcome as no 
soldiers pressing their buttons. Since the weapon-launching depends on all of them 
jointly, a single failure to press the button prevents the occurrence of the launch. 
Intuitively, the abstaining soldier is the “hero” of the case: his failing to press the button 
prevents the death of the innocent children. Similarly, the assassin with a crisis of 
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conscience single-handedly prevents the death of Victim by failing to shoot. 
 These sorts of examples motivate the idea that each assassin in (Hardy Victim) is 
more, rather than less, causally responsible than each assassin in (Victim). The 
counterfactual profile of the cases illustrates a sense in which an outcome depends more 
on a joint cause than on an overdetermining cause, since the joint cause is required for the 
outcome to occur. On this way of thinking, overdetermining agents are less causally 
responsible than jointly causing agents, since either overdeterminer alone was sufficient 
for the outcome. If either overdetermining assassin had abstained, it would not have made 
a difference to Victim’s death. Yet if either jointly causing assassin had abstained, the 
death would not have occurred.6 This is a motivation for the truth of Answer 3: Moral 
Difference: Lesser. 
  Whether the assassins in (Victim) bear more moral responsibility than those in 
(Hardy Victim) depends on which causal concept one employs.7 Here I do not come 
down on either side. Rather, I take the lesson to be that these contrast cases reveal a kind 
of semantic indeterminacy in the causal relation underlying Proportionality—one that 
can be resolved in two motivated, but incompatible, ways. A major reason why there is 
“more than meets the eye” to the idea that moral responsibility is proportionate to causal 
responsibility is that there are multiple causal relations that can be employed in moral 
assessments of differential causal contributions, and there are no clear, principled rules 
for which type of causal relation should be used. As I shall argue in the next section, the 
relationship between causation and moral responsibility faces an even deeper problem 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  One might still resist the intuition that agents in a case of overdetermination are less responsible than 
agents in a case of joint causation. But consider an example involving, say, 100 assassins, each poised at 
individual buttons. Any individual button-push will cause a fatal missile strike to Victim. All 100 assassins 
push their buttons, and Victim dies. Here, any single button-push is sufficient to kill Victim, and Victim’s 
death is overdetermined 99 times over. Many have the intuition that the sheer number of assassins involved 
lessens the moral responsibility of each one. 7	  In my “Causal and Moral Indeterminacy” (forthcoming), I argue that this is a type of indeterminacy that 
afflicts moral responsibility as well. 
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 Above, I outlined a new type of resultant moral luck, proportionality luck, and 
suggested that it is a natural outgrowth of Proportionality, or the idea that an agent’s 
moral responsibility for an outcome is proportionate to her causal contribution to it. I also 
suggested that attempting to apply Proportionality to the Moral Difference Puzzle 
reveals a kind of indeterminacy with respect to whether a productive or a dependent 
causal theory should be used: the sort of causal relation being employed determines 
whether we find an agent to be more or less morally responsible for a particular outcome.  
 As it stands, Proportionality is fairly imprecise. Though we have an intuitive 
idea of what it is for an agent to be more or less a cause of a particular outcome, and 
though we have an intuitive idea of what it is for an agent to bear greater or lesser moral 
responsibility for an outcome, it would be helpful to have a more careful metaphysical 
account of these ideas. Doing so requires, first and foremost, a formulation of what it is 
for one agent to be “more of a cause” of an outcome than another agent, or for anything 
to be “more of a cause” of an outcome than anything else. Call this idea “causal 
differentiation.”8 I will now suggest that accounting for causal differentiation is a serious 
obstacle to a more careful formulation of Proportionality.  
 
3.1 Causal Quantity  
 Causal differentiation is best illustrated by example. Suppose that I hoist a heavy 
Oxford English Dictionary onto a shelf. Now, how much did I cause the book to be lifted 
onto the shelf? A natural answer is: I caused all of the outcome.9  
 In contrast, if a friend helps me lift the book, it is natural to say that each of us 
partially contributes to the placement of the book on the shelf. In that case, each of us 
caused the book to be lifted in virtue of causing part of the book to be lifted. In outcomes 
with multiple causes, locutions such as “x caused y” mean “x caused y in virtue of 
causing a part of y”. We often take something to be a cause in virtue of its making a 
causal contribution– but not the entire contribution– to an outcome.  
 Such cases make it plausible to think of causation as having quantity-like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Michael S. Moore (2009: pp. 118-119) terms a similar concept “the scalar nature of legal causation”. 
Harms with multiple causes are “divisible harms”.  9	  Here I assume that we can distinguish background conditions from causes. 
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properties. Quantity-like properties are features that everyday quantities, like a portion of 
milk, exhibit. I can add to it (by adding more milk), subtract from it (by pouring some 
out), or divide it (by pouring some milk into another glass). Similarly, causal contribution 
can be divided (as when two friends lift a book together), added (as in the case of adding 
more friends to the lifting of the book), and subtracted (as in a case where a causal helper 
is removed.)  
 Not all causal contributions are equal. If five construction workers of varying 
strength and physical aptitude lift a heavy wooden plank, it seems like the weaker 
construction workers causally contribute less to the lifting than the stronger construction 
workers, who shoulder more of the weight.  
 Clearly, there is an intuitive sense in which something can be more or less of a 
cause than something else. But, as I shall now argue, giving a metaphysical account of 
the causal intuition behind Proportionality faces steep obstacles. There are several 
different problems. Some theories of causation cannot account for causal differentiation 
in general. The theories simply do not have the resources to model the idea that there can 
be comparative degrees of causation, or quantitative differences in causal contribution. 
Other theories of causation can account for causal differentiation, but not in a way that 
does justice to our moral intuitions about differential causal contribution. I will now run 
through several leading theories of causation and show how each falls short of being able 
to fully account for Proportionality. The discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, but 
rather to provide an idea of the obstacles to developing a careful account of the 
proportionate relationship between causation and moral responsibility.  
 
3.2 Productive Theories of Causation 
 
 Productive theories of causation hold that causation is a matter of “production” or 
“mark transfer” between c and e. There are many varieties, 10 but here I will focus on 
Dowe’s (2000) theory of physical causation, according to which c is a cause of e if there 
is a transfer of conserved quantity (such as force or energy) from c to e. For example, one 
domino causes another to fall in virtue of the transfer of energy from one to another.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Salmon (1994) is another prominent proponent of so-called “physical causation”. 
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 This view does have resources to account for a sort of causal differentiation. We 
might say that c1 is more of a cause than c2 if c1 transfers greater conserved quantity 
than c2. For example, if assassin 1’s bullet hits Victim with greater impact than that of 
assassin 2, assassin 1 is a greater cause of Victim’s death. 
 But, as one might guess, this view does not generally track the kind of causal 
differentiation relevant to moral responsibility. Consider the following case:  
 
 (Bad Politician) Bad Scientist hoists a weapon onto a launch pad for mere testing. 
 But Bad Politician gains access to the weapon’s computerized control 
 system, and presses the launch button, launching the weapon.  
 
Here, Bad Scientist is responsible for transferring far more conserved quantity to the 
weapon than Bad Politician (who merely presses a button), and yet Bad Politician is 
intuitively more responsible for the weapon’s launch.11  
 Here is another example:  
 
 (Enthusiastic Soldier) It takes two button-pushes to launch a weapon. The call 
 comes down from above, and one soldier presses his button. The other soldier 
 does a dance on top of her button in order to push it.  
 
In this example, the enthusiastic soldier isn’t intuitively more of a cause of the weapon’s 
launch than the unenthusiastic soldier. The difference in conserved quantity is largely 
irrelevant to the intuitive notion of more or less causal contribution as it relates to our 
concept of differential moral responsibility. 
 Certainly, we can imagine counterexamples. Suppose that multiple evil scientists 
are poised on highly sensitive buttons. The more pressure exerted on the button, the 
stronger and more painful the shock delivered to Victim. Here, the amount of force 
transferred to each button does seem relevant to moral evaluation. But this is a mere 
accident of the case. 
 The lesson is that though the conserved quantity theory has the resources to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  One might hold that the Bad Politician case leans too heavily on normative intuitions, especially given 
that the case includes malevolent intentions. But other cases absent such intentions can easily be 
constructed, with the same results: amount of energy transfer is often irrelevant to moral responsibility. 
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account for something’s being more of a cause than something else, this notion of 
causation isn’t usually the salient causal concept in moral evaluation.  
 
3.3 Counterfactual Theories of Causation 
 
 On the simple counterfactual view, causation is the ancestral of counterfactual 
dependence, which roughly holds that c is a cause of e if had c not occurred, e would not 
have occurred. For example: if Billy hadn’t thrown his rock at the window, the window 
would not have shattered. Lewis (1973b, 1979) is the most famous proponent of this 
theory. 
 The law largely utilizes the simple counterfactual account to analyze legal 
responsibility for outcomes.12 According to the law, an agent is generally responsible for 
an outcome if it would not have occurred “but for” the agent’s actions. The simple 
counterfactual account of causation is generally considered the gold standard for judging 
moral responsibility for outcomes. 
 Aside from well-known problems that involve preemption and overdetermination, 
the simple counterfactual account does not have the resources to account for causal 
differentiation. Either a counterfactual dependence holds or it doesn’t; either something is 
a cause or it’s not. Context can play a role in determining which causes are salient, but on 
the simple counterfactual view, it does not play a role in determining if one is more of a 
cause than the other. In (Enthusiastic Soldier), for example, the launching of the weapon 
is counterfactually dependent on both button-pushings. But neither comes out as more of 
a cause than the other. The launching is counterfactually dependent on both.  
 In contrast to the simple counterfactual account, Lewis’ (2004) “influence” 
account admits differential causal contribution of causes. According to this account, 
causation is a matter of counterfactual covariation between modally fragile alterations, 
such that  
 “C influences e if and only if there is a substantial range of c1, c2, … of different 
 not-too-distant alterations of c (including the actual alteration of c) and there is a 
 range of e1, e2, … of alterations of e, at least some of which differ, such that if c1 
 had occurred, e1 would have occurred, and if c2 had occurred, e2 would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See Hart and Honore’s classic (1985), or Moore’s more recent (2009). 
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 occurred, and so on.” (Lewis, 2004) 
 
Influence is meant to track “a pattern of dependence of how, when and whether [e occurs] 
upon how, when and whether [c occurs].” (2004 p. 190) 
 With this theory in hand, consider a case of preemption: Suzy and Billy both 
shoot Victim at the same time; Suzy’s bullet kills Victim; Billy’s bullet hits Victim 
slightly after Suzy’s. Here, Suzy’s bullet preempts Billy’s bullet from killing Victim. 
According to Lewis, alterations of the preempting cause (Suzy’s bullet) covary 
counterfactually with alterations of the effect more than the preempted cause (Billy’s 
bullet) covaries with the effect. Make small changes in, say, the time or manner of Suzy’s 
shooting, and the result is a group of corresponding changes in time or manner of 
Victim’s death. Not so with Billy’s shooting: unless it is altered so radically that it 
impacts Victim instead of Suzy’s, alterations in whether, when, and how it occurs do not 
result in major changes in whether, when, and how Victim’s death occurs. 
 But does influence capture the concept of differential causal contribution relevant 
to moral responsibility? Consider (Bad Politician) under the influence view. An alteration 
on Bad Politician’s button-pushing (for example, a slightly earlier and slightly more 
vigorous button-pushing) results in a small variation in the way that the weapon-
launching occurs: it occurs a few seconds earlier. When we alter Bad Scientist’s 
placement of the weapon on the platform, there are many more differences in the 
launching of the weapon: it launches in a much different way, and with many more 
physical differences, than if Bad Politician had just pressed his button one second earlier. 
There is a stronger pattern of counterfactual covariation between alterations on Bad 
Scientist’s actions and the weapon launching than between Bad Politician’s actions and 
the weapon’s launching. And yet, Bad Politician is an intuitively greater contributor to 
the launching than is Bad Scientist. Obviously, this is due in part to his malicious intent. 
But setting that aside, it still seems obvious that the strength of patterns of counterfactual 
dependence between modally fragile alterations has very little to do with the moral 
analysis of the case. 
 The problem is that whether, when, and how dependence doesn’t necessarily track 
the kind of differential causal contribution relevant to moral assessment. The account is 
bound to yield bizarre judgments in examples such as (Bad Politician), where patterns of 
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counterfactual covariation between alterations are correlated with whether, when, and 
how energy is transferred to the outcome. While Lewis admits that patterns of 
counterfactual dependence between alterations need not track physical energy transfer, it 
is hard to see how we can massage the theory to give an account of causal differentiation 
relevant to moral responsibility.13 Thus while the influence account includes within it a 
notion of differential causal contribution, it doesn’t capture the notion of causal 
differentiation that plays into moral assessment. 
  Finally, I will briefly assess the potential of the interventionist approach vis à vis 
causal differentiation. Roughly, the interventionist approach holds that causation occurs 
when intervening on A produces a change in B owing to the manipulation of A.14 
Interventionists posit causal models of counterfactual relationships between variables. 
Variables represent causal relata. Causal relations are model relative: relations hold 
between variables in some models but not in others, depending on how the models are 
constructed and what the variables represent. Interventionists are counterfactual theorists, 
since the central causal relation in question within each causal model involves 
counterfactual dependence.15 While simple counterfactual theorists must posit what must 
be held fixed in evaluating counterfactuals, interventionists must posit what to hold fixed 
so that a change in B is due to the manipulation in A rather than background causal 
history or irrelevant causal factors. 
 Interventionist counterfactuals gain explanatory power over the simple 
counterfactual approach in two ways. First, interventionists can account for finer-grained 
counterfactuals insofar as their antecedents can be made more complex than those of the 
simple counterfactual theory. For example, rather than simply evaluating the claim “Is it 
the case that if Suzy hadn’t shot, Victim wouldn’t have died?”, the interventionist can ask 
“Is it the case that if Suzy hadn’t shot, but Billy had shot, would Victim have died?” The 
interventionist approach can thus, in some cases, be used to model quantitative 
differences in causal contributions, as well as account for preemption and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Notable exceptions include cases in which hastening or delaying an outcome is morally significant.  14	  Hitchcock (2001) and Woodward (2003), among others, develop the interventionist account in detail. 15	  For an argument that causal models don’t add much explanatory power to counterfactuals, see Briggs 
(2012).	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overdetermination in a way that the simple counterfactual approach cannot.16 
 The second way that interventionism gains explanatory power over the simple 
counterfactual approach is that it can account for moral intuitions about causation. 
Because the default and deviant variables in causal models are decided relative to our 
causal interests, they can be set in such a way that they represent the appropriate moral 
intuitions. For example, in attempting to account for causal differentiation in Bad 
Politician, the interventionist might include intentions in the setting of the variables 
themselves. Similarly with problems about causation by omission that I discuss in the 
following section: whether or not a particular omission counts as a cause of an outcome 
depends on whether there is a norm or expectation in place that the omitted event occur.  
 However, interventionism falls heavily on the side of causal explanation rather 
than causation. Let the project of causal explanation be that of describing causal relations 
through the lens of human-relative interests and uses. Let the project of the metaphysics 
of causation to be that of modeling the mind-independent world as it actually is. 
Approaches to causation that take the relation to directly depend on human-created 
concepts such as norms, expectations, contextual judgments, and “normal” versus 
“abnormal” causal paths, all collapse the distinction between causation and causal 
explanation. Interventionist theories, like contextualism, pragmatism, and contrastivism, 
intertwine human judgments and contexts with the causal relation itself. Interventionist 
models require mind-dependent judgments about variables, including which parts of a 
causal scenario are manipulable in the relevant sort of way. Interventionism and other 
anthropomorphic approaches to causation differ from metaphysical theories of causation 
in their explananda: the former uses human intuition to model causal claims, whereas the 
latter tries to model causation apart from those interests. 
 Now, it might turn out that only causal explanation, rather than causation, can 
offer an account of causal differentiation that comports with our moral intuitions. 
Whether to abandon causation for causal explanation is a complicated methodological 
topic for a different time. For the present purposes, I see little difference between 
interventionists that lean heavily on human intuition, and straightforward contextualist 
and pragmatist approaches that hold that whether or not c is a cause of e is mostly a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  For interesting empirical work on this issue, see Gerstenberg and Langnado (2015). 
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matter of collective human mental activity.17 Such approaches can and do model 
causation in a way that comports with our moral intuitions, but that’s because causation, 
on those views, is bound up with the moral intuitions themselves. So while 
interventionism better explains causal differentiation than the simple counterfactual 
account, much of its extra explanatory power regarding moral responsibility owes to its 
inclusion of human intuition rather than its extra causal resources.  
 
3.4 Omissions and Proportionality 
 
 It is particularly hard to pin down causal differentiation in cases of collective 
causation by omission. Consider the following example: 
 
 (Negligent Subway Buddies) Two buddies—one a Black Belt in martial arts, and 
 the other untrained and inept—witness a mugging in a subway. Together, both 
 could have stopped the mugging, though Black Belt would have been more 
 useful. Neither alone could have stopped the mugging. But both buddies stand by 
 while the mugging occurs and do nothing. 
 
 
Intuitively, Black Belt is more causally responsible for the occurrence of the mugging 
than is Inept. For though both Black Belt and Inept failed to save the victim, one had 
more ability to do so than the other. It is natural to hold that Black Belt is more morally 
responsible for Victim’s mugging than Inept. And note that famous cases of causation by 
omission share a similar structure. For example, wealthy people who fail to give to 
charity are intuitively more morally responsible for the deaths of starving children than 
those who have very little to give.18 
 Consider another example of causal differentiation in causation by omission, this 
time involving proportionality luck: 
 
 (Debtors) Joe’s rent is $800. Joe has no ready cash, but four friends owe him 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In my “Causal Idealism” (forthcoming), I argue that contextualism, contrastivism, and pragmatism about 
causation are explanatorily on par with causal idealism, the view that causation is entirely a projection of 
human mental activity. 18	  See Singer (1972) for this famous argument, and also Bernstein (2014) for a metaphysical model of such 
cases.  
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 money. Two friends owe him $300 each, and the other two friends owe him $500 
 each. Every friend promised to pay Joe back by the start of the month, but none 
 do. Joe does not make rent, and ends up homeless. 
 
There are several notable features of this case. First, it involves causal differentiation: 
intuitively, the individuals who failed to pay back $500 are more responsible than the 
individuals who failed to pay back $300. Second, it involves proportionality luck. For 
each debtor, it is a matter of luck which or how many other debtors repaid or failed to 
repay Joe. For example, had a friend who owed Joe $500 and a friend who owed Joe 
$300 each paid Joe back, then Joe would not have been homeless, and the other two 
debtors would not have been responsible for the homelessness. Assuming that the friends 
did not know about each other, it was a matter of bad moral luck that each other friend 
was delinquent on his or her debt. For had the other friends made good on their debts, Joe 
would have paid his rent, and any individual debtor would have been off the (moral) hook 
for Joe’s ensuing homelessness.  
 As in non-omissive cases, no leading theory of causation accounts for such a 
difference in causal responsibility. For some theories of causation, the problem is the 
same as in ordinary, non-omissive cases of differential causal contribution. Others face 
unique problems with causation by omission.  
 The transfer of energy theory does not apply to causation by omission, for there 
are no causal relata to or from which energy can be transferred. One might try to apply 
the theory counterfactually. One could ask, for example: if the debtors had repaid Joe, 
which of the debtors would have transferred more energy to him? Or: if Black Belt and 
Inept had interfered in the mugging, which would have transferred more energy to 
Victim? But this line of reasoning only reinforces the absurdity of employing an energy 
transfer account of causation to account for causal differentiation in moral contexts. 
Clearly, differences in energy transfer have little relevance to moral intuitions in these 
cases. 
 The simple counterfactual theory of causation cannot account for differential 
causal contribution by omission in precisely the same way that it cannot account for 
“normal” causal differentiation. Either the outcome is counterfactually dependent on a 
particular cause, or it is not. In Negligent Subway Buddies, Victim’s mugging 
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counterfactually depends on both buddies’ failures to intervene. And in Debtors, Joe’s 
failure to pay the rent counterfactually depends on a random collection of any three 
friends’ omissions. But the account does not capture the intricacies or specifics of each 
agent’s causal contribution. 
 Nor does Lewis’ influence theory of causation do the job. Though Lewis extends 
his influence account to causation by omission by holding that there can be alterations on 
events or omissions, he also admits that “It doesn’t makes sense for two distinct absences 
to differ slightly in detail.” (2004, p. 102). And even if one tries to make sense of 
alterations on omissions—for example, altering the way Black Belt sits in the subway car 
ever so slightly—such a change would not result in a corresponding change in the way 
Victim’s mugging occurs.  
 Famously, counterfactual theories of causation also face the problem of profligate 
causation by omission. That problem involves potentially infinite numbers of true 
omissive counterfactual claims. For example, the counterfactual “Had Barack Obama not 
failed to pay Joe $800, Joe would not have been homeless” is true, as is the 
counterfactual “Had Steven Segal not failed to appear out of nowhere and stop the 
subway mugging, the subway mugging wouldn’t have occurred”. Yet, intuitively, neither 
of these is a cause of the relevant outcomes. This is another way in which counterfactual 
theories fail to accommodate differences in causal contribution: too many omissions 
come out as (equal) causes of each outcome.  
 I conclude that none of the preceding leading theories of causation have the 
resources to account for the kind of causal differentiation relevant to moral responsibility. 
This is an obstacle to the creation of a more precise formulation of Proportionality, and 
also an obstacle to a more careful analysis of proportionality luck. Though there are 
several other causal theories I have not discussed here, I suspect that they fall short in 
similar ways.  
 
4.0 Lessons  
  
 My goal has been to show that the relationship between causation and moral 
responsibility so often used in moral assessment is much trickier than previously 
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imagined. It is also particularly methodologically fraught if current causal theories are to 
be the guides. Even the simple idea that an agent’s causal responsibility for an outcome is 
proportionate to her moral responsibility for an outcome generates far-reaching 
consequences and numerous causally weighty interpretations. While there are interesting 
positive lessons to be drawn from Proportionality, including a heretofore unexplored 
kind of resultant moral luck, the principle reveals that our leading metaphysical theories 
of causation are generally not cut out for the ambiguities and intricacies of moral 
evaluation. There is much work to be done before we can trust that linking moral 
responsibility to metaphysical theories of causation clarifies our theories rather than 
obfuscates our thinking on these matters.19 
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